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8. Comparison of the two contracts in the non-electoral period. 
The politician’s expected net utility in the non-electoral period is  
E(U – u | e11) = H’ – K” 
with K”  = (1/2) {[Cb2 / (2 P2b - 1)] + [Cp2 / (2 B -1)]} 
in the case of two agents, and  
E(U – u | e11) = H’ – K’ 
with K’ = P2b [u(T11) P1p + u(T10) (1 – P1p)] + (1 – P2b) [u(T01) P2p + u(T00) (1 – P2p)]  
in  the case of a single agent. 
The politician will prefer to appoint a single agent also in the non-electoral period if  
(36) min K’ ≤ min K”. 
To prove this, it will be sufficient to show that, for an appropriate allocation of incentive payments 
Tij, a value of  K’ that is ≤ min K” can be obtained.
Hypothesizing that  
Cb  = Cp = C and P2b = B   where B = Pr(Ps | e11) (see (A13)) and P2b =Pr (Bs | e11), 
and remembering the value of the payments identified: 
  i)    tb = -Tb      with     Tb = Cb / (2 P2b – 1)   if    P0b ≤ 1/2 < P2b  
 ii)    tp = -Tp     with      Tp = Cp / (2 B – 1),   if  A ≤ 1/2 < B 
then in the two-agent contract in the non-electoral period, one would have 
Tb + Tp = [2 C / (2P2b - 1)] 
Tb + tp = tb + Tp = 0 
tb + tp = -[2 C / (2P2b - 1)] 
This suggests for the single-agent contract, an incentive payment of the type: 
T11 = T > 0 
T10 =  T01 = 0 
T00 = -T 
With these payments, the politician’s expected net utility would be: 
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E(U-u | e11) =  H’ – P2b [u(T11) P1p  + u(T10) (1 – P1p)] + (1 – P2b) [ u(T01) P2p + u(T00) (1 – P2p)] = 
= H’ – (1/2) T2 [P2b P1p – (1 - P2b) (1 - P2p)] = H’- (1/2) T2 ( B - 1 + P2b) 
This attribution is valid, however, only if it satisfies the constraints. Testing shows: 
g1 ≥ 0    T [B -A – (P1b – P2b)] ≥ Cp
g2 ≥ 0    T (P2b – P0b) (P1p – P2p +1) ≥ Cb
g3 ≥ 0    T (B – D + P2b – P3b) ≥ Cbp
g4 ≥ 0    T (B + P2b – 1) ≥ Cbp
We see that the coefficient of T in g2 ≥ 0 is positive if P2b ≥ P0b and, therefore, the constraint g2 can 
be satisfied (for T > Cb /[(P2b – P0b) (P1p – P2p + 1)]). 
In the hypothesis that P2b = B the constraints become: 
g1 ≥ 0    T [2 P2b  – (A + P1b )] ≥ Cp
g2 ≥ 0    T (P2b – P0b) (P1p – P2p +1) ≥ Cb
g3 ≥ 0    T [2 P2b – (P3b + D)] ≥ Cbp
g4 ≥ 0    T (2 P2b – 1) ≥ Cbp
We see that 2 P2b – 1 >0 by hypothesis, so   
g4 ≥ 0    ↔  T ≥ Cbp /[(2P2b – 1)]. 
Since D ≤ B = P2b,   then 2P2b – (P3b + D) > P2b–P3b. Moreover if we suppose that P3b < P2b                   
(or P3b = Pr(Bs | e00) < P2b = Pr(Bs | e11)), then the coefficient of T in g3 ≥ 0  is also positive and the 
result is that g3 ≥ 0    equivalent to  
g3 ≥ 0    ↔  T ≥ Cbp / [(2 P2b – P3b - D)] 
g2 ≥ 0    ↔  if P1p = P2p     T (P2b – P0b) (P1p – P2p + 1) ≥ Cb
There is increasing compatibility between choice of payments and the constraints 
• the lower P0b and P3b: the probability of banking system stability when there is no effort in 
this direction by the agent (consistent with the hypotheses made); 
• the higher P1p: the probability of price stability when there is effort in this direction by the 
agent, in the presence of banking stability. 
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It must be remembered that we put B = P2b, (i.e. Pr(Ps|e11) = Pr(Bs|e11)).  
The tightest condition becomes g4. We therefore choose this as payment and say:  
T = Cbp  / [(2 P2b – 1)]. 
Under these conditions, therefore, the politician’s expected net utility is: 
E(U-u | e11) =  H’- (1/2) T2 (B - 1 + P2b) = H’ – (1/2) T2 (2 P2b - 1) =  
H’ – (1/2) {Cbp2 / [(2 P2b – 1)2]}[(2 P2b – 1)] = H’ – (1/2) {Cbp2 / [(2 P2b – 1)]} 
Consequently, the politician will prefer to entrust the appointment to a single agent also in the non-
electoral period if: 
(1/2) {Cbp2 / [(2 P2b – 1)]} ≤ (1/2) {[Cb2 / (2 P2b - 1)] + [Cp2 / (2 B -1)]} 
But since we hypothesized that Cp = Cb = C e P2b = B,  then we have: 
{Cbp2 / [(2 P2b – 1)]} ≤  2C2 / (2 P2b - 1) 
Therefore the politician will prefer to entrust the appointment to a single agent also in the non-
electoral period if26: 
Cbp2  ≤ 2C2 = Cb2  + Cp2. 
The politician’s choice of single or multiple authorities is therefore not tied to electoral factors. 
What emerges from this model, on the basis of the hypotheses made and the constraints imposed, is 
that the politician always prefers the single authority if the following conditions come about: 
•Cbp ≤ Cp + Cb      i.e. if there are economies of scope;  
• Cb ≤ Cp            if the task of the central bank is more demanding (and this is clear if we consider  
                          that the central bank is also responsible for banking stability as lender of last             
                          resort); 
                                                 
26 It is, however, very easy to give an example in which the previous conditions do not exist, which precludes the use of 
the previous procedure to prove the advantageousness of using a single agent. In contrast, it is not at all easy to give an 
example to show, at least for some values of the parameters, that it is more advantageous to entrust the roles to separate 
agents. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to solve the problem of optimization with a single agent and 
consequently the minimum of K is unknown. We  can however conjecture that it is always more advantageous to 






•P3b < P1b               it is natural to expect this given the definition of these probabilities (in other words  
                          it is normal to expect banking stability to be easier to achieve if there is effort in   
                          this direction on the part of the authority responsible);  
•the lower  P0b and P3b, or the higher the risk of banking crises;  
• the higher P1p is, the probability of price stability when the monetary agent makes an effort to 
attain this, in the presence of stability in the banking system.    
 
9. Remarks and possible developments 
The advantage of entrusting the roles to a single agent can however be conjectured using a simple 
thought process.   
The minimum cost that the politician has to bear for incentives must at least cover the costs of effort 
and must therefore equal Cbp, if there is a single agent, and Cp + Cb if there are two. If Cbp < Cp + 
Cb, then it is clear that it is always more convenient to appoint a single agent. 
In the election period, the politician’s spending on incentives is even lower, in that as he does not 
want the central bank to be over-zealous, it will only equal Cb for two agents and Cbp - Cp for one 
agent. Therefore the minimum spending for the politician must be in the electoral period.  
If however we introduce a reputation cost, R, in cases in which although the central bank wants to 
act, it refrains from doing so in order to please the politician, then in the electoral period if two 
agents are appointed, the politician’s cost will be equivalent to 
Cb + (R/2)    if there are two agents and to 
Cbp - Cp + R  if there is one agent.  
In the non-electoral period, the politician’s costs will be equivalent to  
Cb + Cp     for two agents and to  
Cbp           for one agent.  
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